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Barry Schwartz

Capitalism, The Market, The "Underclass," and the Future*
1. Introduction
Reaganism and its twin sister, Thatcherism, create fortunes
among the highly educated, but in the middle and working classes,
they generate anxiety, insecurity and disparities.... Tax cuts, the
slashing of safety nets and welfare benefits, and global free
trade... unleash the powerful engines of capitalism that go on a
tear. Factories and businesses open and close with startling
speed.... As companies merge, downsize and disappear, the labor
force must always be ready to pick up and move on.... The cost is
paid in social upheaval and family breakdown.... Deserted facto
ries mean gutted neighborhoods, ghost towns, ravaged communi
ties and regions that go from boom to bust.... Conservatism is be
ing confronted with its own contradictions for unbridled capitalism
is an awesome destructive force.
Who said this? Was it Karl Marx? Was it Fidel Castro? Was it Paul
Wellstone or Bernie Sanders? No. The author of the perceptive observa
tion above was Pat Buchanan. I share Charles Murray’s concern that
there is bad news lurking in the shadows of what seems to be unalloyed
prosperity in millennial America. I share his concerns about urban crime,
employment, the fragility of the family, and the coarseness of the culture.
But I’m angry. I’m angry at the resolute refusal of conservatives like
Murray, William Bennett, and James Q. Wilson to face squarely what
their colleague Pat Buchanan is willing to face.
In his essay “And Now for the Bad News,” Murray’s message is that
things haven’t been working nearly as well as we think they have. Crime
is down only because we’ve locked all the hardened criminals away; the
tendency to commit crime has not changed. Unemployment is down, but
those who remain unemployed are contemptuous of work. Illegitimate
births are down, but legitimate births are down even more, as growing
numbers of people seem disdainful of marriage. All these signs of moral
decay Murray traces to the underclass, and he is especially worried be* This paper is a slightly modified version of a commentary written in response to
Charles Murray’s “And Now for the Bad News.” Murray’s article appeared in
Society 37 (1999): 12-14, and this reply followed on pp. 33-42.
Sibelan Forrester and Thomas Newlin, eds. Towards a Classless Society: Studies in
Literature, History, and Politics in Honor of Thompson Bradley. Bloomington, IN:
Slavica, 2004, 179-94.
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cause the middle class seems increasingly to approve of wrhat he calls
“underclass ethics.” He says that “among the many complicated explana
tions for this deterioration in culture, cultural spill-over [from the under
class to the rest of us] is implicated.”
But Murray also says this: “There are many culprits behind the coars
ening of American life. It should also go without saying that vulgarity, vio
lence and the rest were part of mainstream America before the underclass
came along. But these things always used to be universally condemned in
public discourse. Now they are not. It is not just that America has been
defining deviancy down, slackening old moral codes. Inner-city street life
has provided an alternative code and it is attracting converts.”
This is what makes me angry. The idea that middle America needs to
look at the underclass for examples of coarseness is preposterous. It turns
a willfully blind eye to what the conservative revolution has brought us.
The conservatism that captured America’s fancy in the 1980s was actually
two distinct conservatisms. It was an economic conservatism committed to
dismantling the welfare state and turning as many facets of life as possi
ble over to the private sector. And it was a moral conservatism committed
to strengthening traditional values and the social institutions that foster
them. These two conservatisms corresponded to the economic and social
agendas that guided the policies of both the Keagan and the Bush admin
istrations. These Presidents and their supporters seemed to share not only
the belief that free-market economics and traditional moral values are
good, but that they go together.
This has proven to be a serious mistake. The theory and practice of
free-market economics have done more to undermine traditional moral
values than any other social force. It is not permissive parents, unwed
mothers, undisciplined teachers, multicultural curricula, fanatical civil
libertarians, feminists, rock musicians, or drug pushers who are the pri
mary sources of the corrosion that moral conservatives are trying to re
pair. Instead, it is the operation of the market system itself, along with an
ideology that justifies the pursuit of economic self-interest as the
“American way.” And so, I acknowledge that Murray’s concerns about the
“problem of the underclass” are not being solved by our current prosperity.
But I insist that they will never be solved unless we face up squarely to
what causes them. And what causes them, I believe, is in large part what
is responsible for our current prosperity.
I am not going to argue here that the evils of market capitalism de
mand that we all gather to storm the barricades and wrest the means of
production out of the hands of evil capitalists and turn them over to the
state. As everyone says, “the Cold War is over, and we won.” State owner
ship of the means of production is a non-issue. We are all capitalists now.
The issues before us really are two. First, what kind of capitalism? Is it
the capitalism of Reagan and Thatcher—of unregulated markets and pri-
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vatization of everything, with government involvement viewed as a cause
of waste and inefficiency? Or is it the capitalism of John Maynard Keynes
and of Franklin Eoosevelt, with significant state regulation of the market
and state guarantees of life’s necessities? I’m going to argue for the
latter—old-fashioned capitalism. The boom we experienced in the 1990s
created perhaps the greatest degree of income inequality in the history of
the developed world. What the free market teaches us is that what anyone
can have not everyone can have, often with very painful consequences for
the have-nots. And second, if we must live with capitalism, what are we
prepared to do to correct the moral corrosion that it brings as a side effect?
For in addition to asking what free-market capitalism does for people, we
must ask what it does to people. And I will suggest that it turns people
into nasty, self-absorbed, self-interested competitors—that it demands
this of people, and celebrates it.

2. The Market and Inequality
One would think that if the problem is the underclass, the solution—or a
solution—is to reduce its numbers. Well, what do we know about the great
economic “boom” of the 1990s? The income of the average earning worker
in 1997 was 3.1% lower than it was in 1989. Median family income was
$1000 less in 1997 than in 1989. The typical couple worked 250 more
hours in 1997 than in 1989. So to the extent that average people have
been able to hold their own at all, it is because they worked harder. The
median wage of high school graduates fell 6% between 1980 and 1996,
while the median wage of college graduates rose 12%.
And this picture looks worse if you include benefits. Benefits used to
be the “great equalizer,” distributed equally among employees despite
huge disparities in salary. For example, the $20,000/year employee and
the $500,000/year employee got the same $4000 medical insurance. But
despite IRS efforts to prevent differential benefits based on income (by
making such benefits taxable), employers have invented all kinds of
tricks. They have introduced lengthy employment “trial periods” with no
benefits. They have resorted to hiring temporary workers who get no bene
fits. The result is that while 80% of workers received paid vacations and
holidays in 1996, less than 10% in the bottom tenth of the income distri
bution did. The result is that while 70% of workers have some sort of em
ployer funded pension, less than 10% of those in the bottom tenth of the
income distribution do. The result is that while 90% of high wage employ
ees have health insurance, only 26% of low wage employees do. All told,
about 40 million Americans have no health insurance. The picture looks
still worse if you consider wealth rather than income. The richest 1% of
Americans have almost 50% of the nation’s wealth. The next 9% has about
a third. And the remaining 90% has about a sixth.
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America now has the greatest wealth and income inequality in the de
veloped world, and it is getting bigger every day. Efforts to implement
even modest increases in the minimum wage are met with intense resis
tance. Further, the U.S. has the highest poverty rate of any developed na
tion and uses government income transfers to reduce poverty less than
any developed nation. Our two main rivals in these categories are
Thatcher’s England, and post-communist, gangster-capitalist Russia.
Is this massive inequality an accident—an imperfection in an other
wise wonderful system? I don’t think so. Modern capitalism depends on
inequality. Modern capitalism is consumer capitalism. People have to buy
things. In 1997, $120 billion was spent in the U.S. on advertising, more
than was spent on all forms of education. Consumer debt, excluding home
mortgages, exceeded $1 trillion in 1995—more than $10,000 per house
hold. But people also need to save, to accumulate money for investment,
especially now, in these days of ferocious global competition. Well, how
can you save and spend at the same time? The answer is that some must
spend while others save. Income and wealth inequality allow a few to ac
cumulate, and invest, while most of us spend—even more than we earn.
And this is not an accident, but a structural necessity. There must be
some people who despite society-wide exhortation to spend just can’t
spend all they make. These people will provide the capital for investment.
Perhaps this kind of inequality is just the price we pay for prosperity.
Concentrating wealth in the hands of the few gives them the opportunity
to invest. This investment “trickles down” to improve the lives of all, by
improving the products we buy and creating employment opportunities.
There is no question that the current political leadership in the U.S.—of
both parties—thinks that keeping Wall Street happy is essential to the
nation’s financial well-being. By encouraging people to buy stocks we put
money in the hands of investors who then produce innovation and im
provement in economic efficiency. Thus, we reduce capital gains taxes.
And we eliminate the deficit to make Wall Street happy, even if it means
neglecting the social safety net.
But who gains? Is it true that what’s good for Wall Street is good for
America? On investment, more than 90% of all stock market trades in
volve just shuffling of paper as shares move from my hands to yours, or
vice versa. Almost none of the activity on Wall Street puts capital in the
hands of folks who invest in plant and equipment. Similarly, most corpo
rate debt is used to finance mergers and acquisitions, or to buy back stock
that later goes to chief executives as performance bonuses.
Why is it that when a company announces major layoffs, its stock goes
up? The answer is that layoffs signal higher profits, good news for in
vestors. Why is it that when unemployment rates go down, stock prices go
down? The answer is that low unemployment signals potential inflation,
bad news for investors. Why is it that banks bailed out a highly specula-
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tive hedge fund—for rich folks only—that was able to invest borrowed
money (20 times its actual assets) while at the same time lobbying to
crack down on personal bankruptcy laws, when the overwhelming major
ity of those facing personal bankruptcy make less than $20,000/year? The
evidence is clear and compelling: the stock market operates to benefit the
few at the expense of the many.
So if, as Murray contends (correctly, I think), the underclass is a social
problem for America that is not going away, why isn’t Murray demanding
a set of policies that make it smaller rather than larger. Why isn’t he de
manding a minimum wage that is a living wage, so that parents can af
ford to take care of their children. And in addition, why isn’t he demand
ing high-quality day care, so that the children of single mothers, or of two
worker households, won’t be neglected. How is it that a set of economic
policies that has made the underclass bigger glides by free of Murray’s
wrath, as he chooses to condemn instead the nation’s growing enthusiasm
for underclass values?

3. The Market and Morality
When the market as an institution first evolved, many thoughtful people
saw it as a benign—even benevolent—antidote to the arbitrary exercise of
power by kings and princes. As economic historian Albert Hirschman doc
uments in his book The Passions and the Interests, people thought of the
pursuit of “interest” as a vast improvement on the pursuit of “passion,” be
cause “interest” was governed and assessed by means of reason. An “inter
est” governed world would be an orderly and predictable one. As the
market emerged, people came to believe that it would take care of our un
ruly passions. As Adam Smith argued, the market would be self-regulat
ing, guided by Smith’s “invisible hand.”
This ideal, self-regulating market never existed. The invisible hand
needed to be guided by the state, to ameliorate the worst excesses of capi
talism (as market enthusiast George Will once put it, “the market delivers
rough justice. The state takes some of the roughness out of the justice”).
Nonetheless, so long as people could be counted on to bring to the market
a collection of “bourgeois” values that everyone took for granted—honesty,
restraint, diligence, loyalty, self-control, and duty—enthusiastic embrace
of the market as a great social invention was warranted. Adam Smith un
derstood this, but he thought that we could count on these bourgeois val
ues because they were part of human nature. Alexis de Toqueville also
understood this, but he thought that the success of democratic capitalism
in America could rest on the reining in of buccaneer men by their religious
wives; it was the family that was the source of moral values that pre
vented men from being the ruthless creatures that philosopher Thomas
Hobbes had said they were.
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However, more recent thinkers have realized that we can’t take the
bourgeois values that support capitalism for granted. Indeed, as Karl
Polanyi, in The Great Transformation, and Fred Hirsch, in Social Limits
to Growth, argue persuasively, not only can we not take these values for
granted, but market capitalism—the very thing that so desperately de
pends on them—actively undermines them. This, I believe, is the lesson
that Murray and his cohort refuse to accept. The so-called “underclass”
may threaten the comfort and safety of the middle class, but it is the over
class that threatens the stability and the future prospects of society.
One sees this dramatically in James Q. Wilson’s book The Moral
Sense. In that book, Wilson argues for a biologically based moral sense in
human beings—a sense that almost guarantees such moral traits as sym
pathy, duty, self-control, and fairness. I say almost guarantees because
the thrust of Wilson’s argument in that book is that modern cultural and
moral relativism threatens these virtues. The relativist argues for the al
most complete malleability of human nature—of perception, thinking,
emotion, socialization, and social interaction. Culture determines how
people see, how they live, how they love, what they are. And it also de
termines how they judge. With such an enormous range of human social
practices, it is hard to know from what perspective judgments about the
moral worth of those practices can and should be made. At best, such
judgments must be relative to the culture’s own conception of moral
worth. When moral judgments are made, they must be made with due
humility and uncertainty. And perhaps it is best if they are not made at
all.
Thus speaks the relativist, according to Wilson, and Wilson asks: “Are
we prepared for the possibility that by behaving as if no moral judgments
are possible we may create a world that more and more resembles our di
minished moral expectations? We must be careful of what we think we
are, because we may become that.”
Wilson’s aim in his book is to defeat the moral bankruptcy that he sees
as a self-fulfilling consequence of relativism by defeating relativism itself.
And this he tries to do by arguing for the existence of this moral sense—
deeply rooted in biology, and strengthened by various social practices. The
moral sense is indeed a “sense”—not reflective, but intuitive: “By moral
sense I mean an intuitive or directly felt belief about how one ought to act
when one is free to act voluntarily.” And it is fragile—very fragile: “We
have a moral sense, most people instinctively rely on it even if intellectu
als deny it, but it is not always and in every aspect of life strong enough to
withstand a sustained and pervasive attack.” And Wilson argues that it is
now under attack and being eroded, principally by relativism, as reflected
in the deterioration of families, schools, the arts, and other social institu
tions. Wilson argues that relativism is to a degree self-fulfilling through
its effects on our social practices and social institutions. Practices and in-
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stitutions evolve in a way that is consistent with our ideology, and once
they are in place they in turn foster actions that are consistent with the
ideology and provide enormous obstacles to actions that are inconsistent
with it. I suspect that Murray would agree with all this but add to it that
our current “enthusiasm” for the values of the underclass adds to the
damage done by relativism.
I agree with most of what Wilson has to say in his book. I agree that
people have a moral sense. I agree that sympathy, fairness, self-control,
and duty, among others, are moral sentiments. I agree that the moral
sense is extremely fragile, that “we must be careful of what we think we
are, because we may become that.” And yet, despite all this agreement, I
think that Wilson, like Murray, misses the main point. What is assaulting
this moral sense of ours is not just (or even mainly) relativism, but the
market.
In writing about some of the modern forces that have weakened our
moral sense, Wilson makes an extremely important observation: “For all
their differences, many of the dominant ideologies and intellectual ten
dencies of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries have had in common the
replacement of the idea of commitment with the idea of choice.” This,
Wilson argues, is a bad thing for morality, and he is right. To be moral is
to make commitments—to people, to principles, to ideas, to communities.
The things to which one is committed are core parts of the self. In con
trast, choices are merely expressions of preference, and preferences may
come and go. As preferences change, choices will change with them.
Commitment stands in the way of pursuing preferences through choice.
In making this observation about the difference between choice and
commitment, Wilson identifies a variety of intellectual villains—analytic
philosophy, psychoanalysis, Marxism. But what stands out as the disci
pline that hallows preference and choice above all else is neoclassical eco
nomics. And what stands out as the institution that caters to choice as an
expression of preference is the market. Somehow, this most obvious of
candidates for a causal role in the undermining of commitment escapes
Wilson’s attention.
Instead of identifying market institutions and the neoclassical ideol
ogy about how we are supposed to behave in these institutions as part of
the problem, Wilson seems to see them as a civilizing influence. He echoes
Hirschman’s point that the pursuit of one’s interests, in markets, was an
enormous improvement on the world of Hobbes, in which people pursued
their passions, often on battlefields. Wilson largely embraces Hirschman’s
analysis when he writes:
Many people believe that commerce not only requires but develops
habits of impersonal valuation and fair dealing. Many European
thinkers in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries hoped that
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calm, commercial interests would help tame man’s unruly and pa
rochial passions. Personal vendettas, dynastic wars, predatory sex
uality, and endless duels upset the predictable routines on which
large-scale commerce depends. In this view, families obsessed with
honor may find it more difficult than those preoccupied with gain
to prosper in commercial transactions. Commercial life requires
transactions—^buying, selling, lending, borrowing—that are made
easier by trust and a reputation for trustworthiness.
I think that Hirschman is convincing on this point, and thus I have no
problem with Wilson’s endorsement of this view. But what Hirschman
made clear that Wilson does not is that the sweet, civilizing influence of
commerce may have been the product of a particular historical time and
place. Moreover, the civilizing influence of commerce may depend on as
pects of the human character that may themselves be undermined by the
very commercial activity that they civilize.
Wilson’s apparent blind spot to the corrosive effects of the market
shows up in his discussion of a famous line from Rousseau’s Discourse on
the Origin of Inequality: “The first man who, having enclosed a piece of
ground, bethought himself of saying. This is mine, and found people
simple enough to believe him, was the real founder of civil society,” which
was to become “the source of a thousand quarrels and conflicts.” Wilson
notes that Rousseau’s contemporaries interpreted this as an argument
against inequality. But Wilson sees it as an “argument against civiliza
tion.” To me, it is an argument against private property, or at least a
warning about the dangers of private property and a system that encour
ages exchange of private property for gain. In discussing gangs and the
market in illicit goods, Wilson notes that in gangs “economic activity is
separated from family maintenance and organized around capital that can
be seized by predation.” No doubt this is an accurate description of the
culture and economy of gangs. But it seems to me to be an equally accu
rate description of the modern financial marketplace. If the eighteen-hour
workdays and slash-and-burn takeovers that have grown increasingly
common in recent years are not examples of economic activity that is
predatory and separated from family maintenance, I do not know what is.
Having made the sweeping claim that the market contributes more to
the erosion of our moral sense than any other modern social force, I want
to defend that claim with some more specific arguments. In particular, I
want to discuss the market’s negative effects on some of the moral senti
ments that Wilson emphasizes and on some of the social institutions that
nurture those sentiments.
One of the moral sentiments that is central to Wilson’s argument is
sympathy, the ability to feel and understand the misfortune of others and
the desire to do something to ameliorate that misfortune. Wilson notes
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correctly that other-regarding sentiments and actions, including sympathy
and altruism, are extremely common human phenomena, notwithstanding
the efforts of many cynical social scientists to explain them away as subtle
forms of self-interested behavior. What the literature on sympathy and
altruism have made clear is that they depend on a person’s ability to take
the perspective of another (to “walk a mile in her shoes”). This
perspective-taking ability in turn depends on a certain general cognitive
sophistication, on familiarity with the other, and on proximity to the
other. What does the market do to sympathy? Well, the market thrives on
anonymity. One of its great virtues is that buyers are interchangeable
with other buyers and sellers with other sellers. All that matters is price
and quality and the ability to pay. Increasingly, in the modern market,
transactions occur over long distances. (Indeed, increasingly, they occur
over modem lines, as “e-commerce” joins the lexicon.) Thus, the social in
stitution that dominates modern American society is one that fosters, both
in principle and in fact, social relations that are distant and impersonal—
social relations that are the antithesis of what sympathy seems to require.
A second moral sentiment that attracts Wilson’s attention is fairness.
He correctly notes (as any parent will confirm) that concern about fairness
appears early in human development and that it runs deep. Even fouryear-olds have a powerful, if imperfect, conception of what is and is not
fair. So what does fairness look like in adults?
Daniel Kahneman, Jack Knetsch, and Richard Thaler asked this ques
tion by posing a variety of hypothetical business transactions to randomly
chosen informants and asking the informants to judge whether the trans
actions were fair. What these hypothetical transactions had in common
was that they all involved legal, profit-maximizing actions that were of
questionable moral character. What these researchers found is that the
overwhelming majority of people have a very strong sense of what is fair.
While people believe that businesspeople are entitled to make a profit,
they do not think it fair for producers to charge what the market will bear
(for example, to price gouge during shortages) or to lower wages during
periods of slack employment. In short, most people think that concerns for
fairness should be a constraint on profit-seeking. So far, so good; this
study clearly supports Wilson’s contention that fairness is one of our
moral sentiments.
But here’s the bad news. Another investigator posed these same hypotheticals to students in a nationally prominent MBA program. The over
whelming majority of these informants thought that anything was fair, as
long as it was legal. Maximizing profit was the point; fairness was irrele
vant. In another study, these same hypotheticals were posed to a group of
CEOs. What the authors of the study concluded was that their executive
sample was less inclined than those in the original study to find the ac
tions posed in the survey to be unfair. In addition, often when CEOs did
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rate actions as unfair, they indicated in unsolicited comments that they
did not think the actions were unfair so much as they were unwise, that
is, bad business practice.
Finally, another study exposed undergraduates to a variety of bargain
ing games. One of them was the famous “prisoners’ dilemma,” a circum
stance in which both players do better with mutual cooperation than with
mutual defection and yet the logic of the situation pushes each player to
defect. The study found that sixty-one percent of participants cooperated
in these prisoners’ dilemma games—unless they were economics majors.
Among economics majors, only forty percent cooperated. Another game
was something known as the “ultimatum bargaining game.” In this game
one player is given control of a resource (say ten dollars) and must decide
how to apportion it between himself and the other player. The other
player can either accept the proposed split (and take whatever his portion
is) or reject it, in which case both players get nothing. The logic of this sit
uation suggests that the recipient of the offer should accept any offer (a
penny, a dime, a quarter?) since something is better than nothing. Thus,
the controller of the resource, knowing that the other player should accept
any offer, should offer as little as the rules of the game allow. Despite the
logic of this game, the most common choice among participants is a fiftyfifty split, in the name of fairness—unless, again, they are economics
majors.
To summarize, people care about fairness, but if they are participants
in the market, or are preparing to be participants in the market, they care
much less about fairness than others do. Is it the ideology of relativism
that is undermining this moral sentiment or the ideology of the market?
Another of the moral sentiments Wilson discusses is self-control. What
does the market do to self-control? As many have pointed out, modern cor
porate management is hardly a paradigm of self-control. The combination
of short-termism and me-first management that have saddled large com
panies with inefficiency and debt are a cautionary tale on the evils of selfindulgence. Short-termism is in part structural; managers must answer to
shareholders, and in the financial markets, you’re only as good as your
last quarter. Me-first management seems to be pure greed. Some of the
excesses of modern executive compensation have recently been docu
mented by Derek Bok, in his book The Cost of Talent. Further, The
Economist, in a survey of pay published in May of 1999, makes it quite
clear that the pay scale of American executives is in another universe
from that in any other nation, and heavily loaded with stock options that
reward the executive for the company’s performance in the stock market
rather than the actual markets in goods and services in which the com
pany operates.
But there is a market-driven challenge to self-control that is more
fundamental and more pervasive than either short-termism or me-
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firstism. Wilson cites drug addiction as the paradigm case of the failure of
self-control. And it surely is. But what about addiction to consumption?
Most modern Americans now suffer from what I have elsewhere called
“thing-addiction,” and unlike addiction to drugs, addiction to things is ac
tively encouraged by society. School kids hear no horror stories about
credit-card debt; instead, they are bombarded daily with enticements to
buy and their parents are daily offered new opportunities for credit.
Discouraging consumption seems positively un-American. And since our
economy requires constant expansion of demand to stay prosperous, thing
addiction is an addiction on which we must rely. If there is a social force
that does more to undermine self-control than modern advertising (“Just
do it!”), I don’t know what it is. Surely, cultural relativism pales in
comparison.
The final moral sentiment that Wilson identifies and discusses is duty,
“a disposition to honor obligations even without hope of reward or fear of
punishment.” Wilson is quite right about the importance of duty. If we
must rely on threat of punishment to enforce obligations, they become un
enforceable. Punishment works only as long as most people will do the
right thing most of the time even if they can get away with transgressing.
Not only do the costs of enforcement become prohibitive as more and more
people are willing to transgress, but we also face the problem of monitor
ing the behavior of the enforcers themselves. If evidence is needed on this
point, just consider how choked our judicial system presently is. Criminal
proceedings are almost always plea-bargained. Convicted criminals do lit
tle time in part because there is no place to put them. Civil actions take
years to litigate.
The enemy of duty is free-riding, taking cost-free advantage of the du
tiful actions of others. The more people are willing to be free-riders, the
higher the cost to those who remain dutiful, and the higher the cost of en
forcement to society as a whole. How does the market affect duty and free
riding? Well, one of the studies of fairness I mentioned above included a
report of an investigation of free-riding. Economics students are more
likely to be free riders than students in other disciplines. And this should
come as no surprise. Free-riding is the “rational, self-interested” thing to
do. Indeed, if you are the head of a company, free-riding may even be your
fiduciary responsibility. So if free-riding is the enemy of duty, then the
market is the enemy of duty.
Another example of what the market does to duty comes from a dra
matic recent study by Bruno Frey. Citizens of Switzerland were about to
decide in a national referendum where nuclear waste dumps should be lo
cated. The issue was hotly debated, and citizens were well-informed. Frey
surveyed a group of citizens and found that about 60% were willing to
accept the nuclear waste site in their area. They knew is was potentially
dangerous, and they didn’t want it, but it was a matter of civic re-
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sponsibility, of duty. Another group of citizens was offered money, up to
the equivalent of 6-weeks pay for the average Swiss worker, to accept the
waste site. Among these people, less than 25% agreed to accept the dump.
According to Frey’s analysis, the offer of money turned the issue from a
matter of duty to a matter of self-interest, and most people thought that
no amount of money made it serve their self-interest to have a dump in
their neighborhood. In my view, this is what market activity does to all
the virtues that Wilson, and Murray long for—it submerges them with
calculations of personal preference and self-interest.
If Wilson fails to acknowledge the influence of the market on our
moral sense, where then does he look? As I said earlier, he thinks a good
deal of human morality reflects innate predisposition. But that disposition
must be nurtured, and it is nurtured, according to Wilson, in the family,
by what might be described as “constrained socialization.” The child is not
a miniature adult (socialization is required), but nor is she a blank slate
(not anything is possible; there are predispositions on the part of both
parents and children for socialization to take one of a few “canonical”
forms). One of the primary mechanisms through which socialization oc
curs is imitation: “There can be little doubt that we learn a lot about how
we ought to behave from watching others, especially others to whom we
are strongly attached. Our tendency to imitate has probably been very im
portant for the survival of the species.” Thus Wilson, like Murray, is very
much concerned with the shape of the modern family.
So let us accept Wilson’s position about socialization and ask what the
adults who the young child will be imitating look like. I believe, following
the work of Fred Hirsch mentioned earlier, that in the last few decades
there has been an enormous upsurge in what might be called the
“commercialization of social relations”—that choice has replaced duty and
utility maximization replaced fairness in relations among family mem
bers. Economist Gary Becker won a Nobel Prize in part for using the lens
of market analysis to account for behavior in families. Becker thought, of
course, that in discussing family size in terms of opportunity costs and
marital fidelity in terms of available substitutes along with transaction
costs associated with ending a marriage, he was merely describing things
as they are, and always have been. I believe, in contrast, that he is de
scribing things as they have become, or are becoming.
Wilson seems mindful of all this. He decries the modern emphasis on
rights and the neglect of duty. He acknowledges that modern society has
posed a real challenge to the family by substituting labor markets for
house-holding. And he deplores the ideology of choice as applied to the
family:
Not even the family has been immune to the ideology of choice. In
the 1960s and 1970s (but less so today) books were written advo-
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eating “alternative” families and “open” marriages. A couple could
choose to have a trial marriage, a regular marriage but without an
obligation to sexual fidelity, or a revocable marriage with an easy
exit provided by no-fault divorce. A woman could choose to have a
child out of wedlock and to raise it alone. Marriage was but one of
several “options” by which men and women could manage their
intimate needs, an option that ought to be carefully negotiated in
order to preserve the rights of each contracting party. The family,
in this view, was no longer the cornerstone of human life, it was
one of several “relationships” from which individuals could choose
so as to maximize their personal goals.
But instead of attributing this ideology of choice to the market, from
which I think it clearly arises, Wilson attributes it to the weakening of
cultural standards—to relativism. Indeed he even adopts a Becker-like
economic analysis of the family himself, apparently unaware that if people
actually thought about their families in the way that he and Becker claim
they do, the family would hardly be a source of any of the moral senti
ments that are important to him:
But powerful as they are, the expression of these [familial] in
stincts has been modified by contemporary circumstances. When
children have less economic value, then, at the margin, fewer chil
dren will be produced, marriage (and childbearing) will be post
poned, and more marriages will end in divorce. And those children
who are produced will be raised, at the margin, in ways that re
flect their higher opportunity cost. Some will be neglected and
others will be cared for in ways that minimize the parental cost in
personal freedom, extra income, or career opportunities.
Let me be clear that I think Wilson is right about changes that have
occurred in the family, and that he is also right about the unfortunate so
cial consequences of those changes. His mistake is in failing to see the re
sponsibility for these changes that must be borne by the spread of market
thinking into the domain of our intimate social relations. As I have said
elsewhere, there is an opportunity cost to thinking about one’s social rela
tions in terms of opportunity costs. In Wilson’s terms, that opportunity
cost will be paid in sympathy, fairness, and duty. Sociologist Arlie
Hochschild has written that “each marriage bears the footprints of eco
nomic and cultural trends which originate far outside marriage.” Wilson’s
analysis has emphasized the cultural and overlooked the economic. And
so, alas, has Murray’s.
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4. What Economies Do To People

In Arthur Miller’s play, All My Sons, much of the drama centers around
the belated discovery by a son that his father knowingly shipped defective
airplane parts to fulfill a government contract during World War II. The
parts were installed, some of the planes crashed, and pilots and their
crews were killed. The man responsible, the father, is a good man, a kind
man, a man who cares deeply about his family and would do anything to
protect them and provide for them. His son simply can’t imagine that a
man like his father is capable of such an act. But he is. As he explains, he
was under enormous pressure to deliver the goods. The military needed
the parts right away, and failure to deliver would have destroyed his
business. He had a responsibility to take care of his family. And anyway,
there was no certainty that the parts would not hold up when in use. As
the truth slowly comes out, the audience has the same incredulity as the
son. How could it be? If a man like that could do a thing like that, then
anyone is capable of doing anything.
This, of course, is one of the play’s major points. Almost anyone is ca
pable of almost anything. A monstrous system can make a monster of
anyone, or perhaps more accurately, can make almost anyone do mon
strous things. We see this as dramas like Miller’s get played out in real
life, with horrifyingly tragic consequences.
• All too close to the story of All My Sons, military contractors have
been caught knowingly making and selling defective brake systems
for U.S. jet fighters, defective machine gun parts that cause the
guns to jam when used, and defective fire-fighting equipment for
navy ships.
• An automobile manufacturer knowingly made and sold a dangerous
car, whose gas tank was alarmingly likely to explode in rear end
collisions. This defect could have been corrected at a cost of a few
dollars per car.
• A chemical company continued operating a chemical plant in
Bhopal, India long after it knew the plant was unsafe. A gas leak
killed more than 2000 people, and seriously injured more than
30,000. The $5 billion company responded to this tragedy by send
ing $1 million in disaster relief and a shipment of medicines suffi
cient for about 400 people.
• Other drug and chemical manufacturers make and sell to the Third
World products known to be sufficiently dangerous that their sale is
banned in the U.S.
• The asbestos industry knowingly concealed the hazardous nature of
their products for years from workers who were exposed to carcino
gens on a daily basis.
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• Trucking companies put trucks on the road more than 30% of which
would fail safety inspections and are thus hazards to their drivers
as well as to other motorists.
• And of course, we all know now about the tobacco industry.
And it isn’t just about dramatic death and destruction. The death and de
struction can be slow and tortured:
• Firms get closed down, people put out of work, and communities
destroyed, not because they aren’t profitable, but because they
aren’t as profitable as other parts of the business.
• People are put to work in illegal sweatshops, or the work is sent off
shore, where the working conditions are even worse, but not illegal.
Why does all this abuse occur? What makes people seek to exploit
every advantage over their customers? What makes bosses abuse their
employees? Do the people who do these things take pleasure from hurting
their unsuspecting customers? Do they relish the opportunity to take ad
vantage of people? It doesn’t seem so. When bosses are challenged about
their unscrupulous practices, they typically argue that “everybody does it.”
Understand, the argument is not that since everybody does it, it’s all
right. The argument is that since everybody does it, you have to do it also,
in self-defense. In competitive situations, it seems inevitable that dishon
est, inhumane practices will drive out the honest and humane ones; hu
maneness becomes a luxury that few businesspeople can afford.
I find it unimaginable as I talk to the talented, ambitious, enthusiastic
students with whom I work that any of them aspires to a future in which
he or she will oversee the production of cars, drugs, chemicals, foods, mili
tary supplies, or anything else that will imperil the lives of thousands of
people. I even find it unimaginable that any of them will accept such a
future. They are good, decent people, as far removed from those who seek
to turn human weakness and vulnerability into profit as anyone could be.
And yet, I know that some of my former students already have, and some
of my current students surely will accept such positions. They will also
marry, have families, and raise wonderful children who won’t believe their
parents could ever do such things. Surely there is an urgent need to figure
out what it is that makes good people do such bad things, and stop it.
The leaders of corporations tell themselves that they have only one
mission—to do whatever they can to further the interests of the share
holders, the owners of the company that these leaders have been hired to
manage. When the leaders of corporations say these things to themselves,
they are telling themselves the truth. They work within a system that
asks—even requires—them to be single-minded, no matter how much they
wish they could be different. As long as the system has this character, we
can expect that only the single-minded will rise to the top. Only rarely will
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people whose intentions are to change corporate practices go far enough to
implement those intentions.
Several years ago United States Catholic Bishops drafted a position
paper, a pastoral letter, on the economy. In it they said, “every perspective
on economic life that is human, moral, and Christian must be shaped by
two questions: What does the economy do for people? What does the econ
omy do to people?” I have been suggesting that our economy does terrible
things to people, even to those people who succeed. It makes them into
people that they shouldn’t and don’t want to be, and it encourages them to
do things that they shouldn’t and don’t want to do. No matter what an
economy does for these people, it can’t be justified if it does these things to
them. And it seems to me that in the face of massive, antisocial practices
like these, blaming the underclass for teaching mainstream America the
lessons of incivility is perverse. Indeed, it’s downright grotesque.

^ I have known and worked with Tom Bradley since I joined the Swarthmore
College faculty 30 years ago. For most of that time, he has been my teacher.
Without his influence, I would never have written the words, or even thought the
thoughts, contained above. The most important thing I learned from Tom was not
a particular kind of historical and economic analysis, nor even an abiding concern
for social justice, though I learned much from him on these matters. The most
important thing I learned from him was how to be in the world—how to be
committed, how to be passionate, how to be kind and respectful, how to be honest
but gentle, how to encourage people to do more than they ever thought possible,
and then value them for their contributions, even when they really could and
should have done more. I don’t do any of these things as well as Tom does, but I
probably wouldn’t have done them at all without his help and encouragement.
Tom embodies and displays all the traits of character that Murray and Wilson
mourn, and he does it on a daily basis. He is, in a word, a “mensch,” and a
“mensch” of the highest order. For what Tom has exemplified for me, and for what
he has exemplified for his students and his other colleagues, I will always be
grateful.

